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Consultation and Legitimacy in
Transnational Standard-Setting
Caroline Bradley*
The recent financial crisis has generated agreement on the
need for new transnational standards for financial regulation.
When governments work together to develop transnational
standards and rules they do so using processes which are not
uniform, which often seem to develop in an ad hoc manner, and
which do not necessarily reflect any particular conception of
good government. Transnational standard-setters have
responded to critiques of the legitimacy of their role by
emphasizing consultation of stakeholders. This article will
compare the uses of consultation in the development of policy
at the national and supranational levels. It will examine the
weaknesses in the construction of transnational consultations
which undermine their value as mechanisms of legitimation.
For example, transnational consultations lack visibility, they
are usually carried out in a limited number of languages, or
even only in English. More fundamentally, this article will
critique the stakeholder focus of transnational consultations. In
practice the identification of stakeholders who are potential
respondents to consultations seems to imply that there may be
others (non-stakeholders) whose views are less important. As
the financial crisis has shown, it is not only those who consider
themselves to be stakeholders in financial regulation who are
affected by its failures.
I. INTRODUCTION: TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL
STANDARD-SETTING
The global financial crisis demonstrated the transnational
nature of financial market activity and persuaded governments
to commit to an intensified co-ordination of financial market
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, PO Box 248087, Coral
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regulation,1 including a review of existing harmonized
standards,2 the introduction of new harmonized regulatory
standards,3 and the development of new structures for
addressing systemic risks.4 At the same time, the crisis meant
that financial regulation (often treated as a technocratic
sphere) came to be seen as a matter of significant domestic
political interest.5 For example, politicians, regulators and
private sector groups recognized that citizen-voters were
offended by the fact that bankers, who were seen as having
caused the crisis and whose institutions were bailed out by
taxpayers, nevertheless had contractual rights to large bonuses
while non-bankers suffered increased rates of mortgage
foreclosure and unemployment.6 Market and regulatory
1. See, e.g., The Group of Twenty [G-20], Declaration on Strengthening
the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.g20.org/Document
s/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf; cf. Elliott Posner,
Making Rules for Global Finance: Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation at the
Turn of the Millennium, 63 INT’L ORG. 665, 669 (2009) (describing an
institutionalization of transnational co-operation in financial regulation after
2002).
2. See, e.g., Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Comm. on Banking
Supervision, Consultative Document: Proposed Enhancements to the Basel II
Framework, 1 (Jan. 2009) available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf
(“The Basel Committee has finalised its proposals for enhancing the Basel II
framework in the area of securitisation and more specifically for dealing with
resecuritisations. These enhancements are intended to strengthen the
framework and respond to lessons learned from the financial crisis.”).
3. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[O]nce recovery is assured, prudential regulatory
standards should be strengthened. Buffers above regulatory minima should be
increased and the quality of capital should be enhanced. Guidelines for
harmonisation of the definition of capital should be produced by end 2009. The
BCBS should review minimum levels of capital and develop recommendations
in 2010.").
4. G-20, supra note 1, at 1 (“We have agreed that the Financial Stability
Forum should be expanded, given a broadened mandate to promote financial
stability, and re-established with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced
capacity as the Financial Stability Board (FSB).”).
5. In the aftermath of elections in the UK and the US during 2010,
newly empowered politicians called for changes in financial regulation. See,
e.g., HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION:
JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, 2010, Cm. 7874, available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_financial_regulation_condoc.pdf; R.
Christian Bruce, Congress: GOP-Controlled House of Representatives May
Shape Rulewriting Under Dodd-Frank, 42 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2093
(Nov. 4, 2010).
6. See, e.g., Productivity Commission, Executive Remuneration in
Australia, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report No 49, (2009) [xv] (Austl.),
available at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/93590/executiveremuneration-report.pdf (“A catalyst for this inquiry was concern that
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failures in the financial markets7 were acknowledged to have
imposed externalities on those outside the financial markets.8
These developments led to debates about the extent to which
the financial markets provide value to the real economy.9

executive pay had got out of hand. This perception was fuelled by practices in
financial institutions abroad that were seen as a key contributor to the global
financial crisis (GFC). Further, while local shareholder value plummeted in
2008 as a result of that imported crisis—with some companies and sectors
being propped up by taxpayers—executive pay seemed to emerge unscathed,
crystallising a view that executives were being rewarded for failure (after
having been rewarded for success).”); Financial Services Authority (FSA),
Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services, CP 09/10 (2009),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp09_10.pdf; The Conference Board
[TCB], The Conference Board Task Force on Executive Compensation (Sep.
2009), available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/ExecCompensatio
n2009.pdf.
7. See, e.g., FSA, The Turner Review: a Regulatory Response to the Global
Banking Crisis, at 22 (Mar. 2009) [hereinafter The Turner Review], available
at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf (identifying excessive
reliance on particular risk management techniques as a factor contributing to
the crisis: “Central to many of the techniques was the concept of Value-at-Risk
(VAR), enabling inferences about forward-looking risk to be drawn from the
observation of past patterns of price movement. This technique, developed in
the early 1990s, was not only accepted as standard across the industry, but
adopted by regulators as the basis for calculating trading risk and required
capital, (being incorporated for instance within the European Capital
Adequacy Directive).”).
8. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT:
SHADOW BANKING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, 41 (May 4, 2010), available at
http://c0182732.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/2010-0505-ShadowBanking.pdf (“[M]any financial firms were crippled, and some only survived
with substantial government assistance. Their capital was depleted and many
of their revenue channels were extinguished or impaired by the decline in
financial activity. This condition severely restricted their capacity to provide
funding to consumers, businesses, and governments, reinforcing reductions in
real economic activity around the world and magnifying the ensuing
recession.”).
9. See, e.g., Adair Turner, Speech at CASS Business School: What Do
Banks Do, What Should They Do and What Public Policies Are Needed to
Ensure Best Results for the Real Economy? (Mar.17, 2010),
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/speeches/at_17mar10.pdf; cf. SOMO, EU Financial
Reforms Newsletter (April 2010), http://somo.nl/dossiers-en/sectors/financial/eu
-financial-reforms/newsletter-finance/april_2010/view (“The financial sector
has the potential to serve the real economy, to improve sustainability and to
help people in need, for instance, through credit and investments. However,
recent financial crises have shown that the financial industry primarily serves
itself. The financial sector has become so powerful that some say we "live in
financial times". It is therefore important to seize the momentum of the
ongoing financial reforms to truly transform the financial sector so it serves
the real economy, the environment and the interests of the most vulnerable
within Europe and especially within developing countries.”).
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Even before the crisis a number of transnational
organizations developed standards for financial regulation:10 at
the international level, the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO),11 the Basel Committee on
and
the
Banking
Supervision
(Basel
Committee),12
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)13
have all published harmonized principles of financial
regulation. The European Union (EU) has promulgated
harmonized rules of financial regulation which are binding on
its members.14 Since the crisis, efforts to develop and
implement transnational standards have intensified.
Supranational standards and rules often require
implementation within domestic legal systems in order to be
effective. EU harmonization measures which are binding on the
Member States are often15 structured as directives, which
require Member State legislation for implementation, and
standards developed by bodies such as the Basel Committee
and IOSCO are not formally binding, leaving some discretion to
states which implement them.16 The International Monetary
10. Note on terminology: this paper refers to the products of the Basel
Committee and IOSCO as standards rather than rules because of their
formally non-binding character. However, IOSCO and the Basel Committee
often refer to what they produce as principles, rather than as standards. Their
principles are principles which should be reflected in domestic regulatory
schemes, rather than standards to be met by the suppliers of financial
services, which would be more analogous to the products of other standards
processes.
11. For a discussion of IOSCO’s Principles of Securities Regulation see, for
example, K. Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 116–120 (2002).
12. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS
REGULATION 104 (2000) (describing how central bank governors established
what is now the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in response to the
failures of the Herstaat Bank and Franklin National Bank in 1974).
13. See, e.g., Pistor, supra note 11 at 120–21.
14. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Consumers of Financial Services and
Multi-level Regulation in the European Union, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L J. 701
(2008).
15. Although not always. See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on Credit
Rating Agencies, O.J. No. L 302/1 (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:302:0001:0031:EN:P
DF.
16. See, e.g., D.E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision: an Enforceable International Financial Standard?, 28 B. C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 237, 286 (2005) (“[B]ecause the agreements are not legally
enforceable, nations can vary in their own interpretation and implementation
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Fund (IMF) and the World Bank monitor implementation of
standards by their members.17 Weaker states will tend to have
less discretion in implementation than more powerful states,
but even more powerful states notice the results of reviews by
the international financial institutions.18 Since the financial
crisis the Financial Stability Board has begun a system of peer
review to supplement the FSAP and ROSC programs.19
Where discretion in implementation of transnational
standards is limited, formally as is often the case in the EU,20
of the standards.”).
17. The IMF and World Bank do so through Reports on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSC) and the Financial Sector Assessment Program
(FSAP). See, e.g., The World Bank, Reports on the Observance of Standards
and Codes (ROSC): Overview of the ROSC Accounting and Auditing Program
(Jan. 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa_overview.pdf,
IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fsa/eng/index.htm.
18. See, e.g., IMF, Financial Sector Assessment Program, United States of
America: The IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation—
Detailed Assessment of Implementation, at 26, IMF Country Report No. 10/125
(May 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr10125.
pdf (“The overall ratings in the Report, however, do not reflect the CFTC’s and
SEC’s regulatory successes and, in some cases, suggest a misunderstanding of
the U.S. regulatory system. Thus, the Commissions strongly disagree with
many of the ratings in the Report. By way of example, while the IOSCO
Principles recognize that regulators may use different approaches to
accomplish the same objectives, the Report’s rating on market intermediaries
is based on the assumption that every intermediary must be regulated the
same way. That is, they must undergo an extensive review prior to
registration. This requirement, however, cannot be found in the Principles or
the assessment Methodology. The Report rejects a legitimate risk-based
approach to a registration requirement and oversight of futures and securities
intermediaries without evidence that the approach is ineffective. The Report
also states that capital requirements for futures and securities firms do not
fully address risk, yet provides no evidence that the CFTC’s and SEC’s current
requirements do not already exceed recognized international best practice as
reflected in the Principles.”).
19. See Financial Stability Board (FSB), Country Review of Mexico: Peer
Review Report, at 3 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at http://www.financialstability
board.org/publications/r_100927.pdf (“FSB country peer reviews are intended
to complement and support the IMF-World Bank Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) by providing an opportunity for members to engage in
dialogue with their FSB peers and share experiences on progress made in
addressing relevant FSAP recommendations—notably those covering or
requiring improvements in regulation, supervision and institutional and
market infrastructure.”); FSB, Thematic Review on Compensation: Peer
Review
Report
(Mar.
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100330a.pdf.
20. A number of the EU’s single market measures are maximum
standards measures. See, e.g., Directive 2003/71/EC, of the European
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or because of the need to pacify international financial
institutions (IFIs) or perhaps because of public commitments
such as those made in the G20’s crisis-related declarations,21
the processes whereby the transnational standards are agreed
upon become more significant.22
Before the crisis, and in response to critiques of the
transparency and inclusiveness of transnational standardsetting,23 supranational standard-setters began to formalize
their procedures, developing practices for consulting on
proposed standards, and even establishing consultation
policies.24 The transnational standard-setters are transplanting
a technique which is often used in the domestic context,
particularly in the domestic regulatory context, to their own
transnational sphere. But there are significant differences
between this transnational context and the domestic context.
Some commentators have argued that the multi-level features
of transnational standard-setting may in fact enhance
Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the Prospectus to be
Published When Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading
and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, O.J. No. L 345/64 (Dec. 31, 2003).
21. See also IMF, The G-20 Mutual Assessment Process and the Role of the
Fund (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/1
20209a.pdf; FSB, FSB Framework for Strengthening Adherence to
International
Standards
(Jan.
9,
2010),
available
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_100109a.pdf.
22. In this paper I do not seek to argue that there is one optimal
procedure for the development of transnational standards, but to critique
current consultation processes as a component of such procedures. The
literature on global administrative law tends to assume that a global
administrative law should be based on Western principles. See, e.g., Carol
Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17
EUR. J. INT’L L. 187, 207 (2006) (“Administrative law is largely a Western
construct, taking its shape during the late 19th century as an instrument for
the control of public power.”). Harlow questions this assumption. See, e.g., id.
at 213–4, (arguing “for pluralism: for diversity as the overarching value and
for subsidiarity as the fundamental principle of global administrative law.
Otherwise, the likely contribution of global administrative law will be to stifle
what is democratic and legitimate what is not.”).
23. For a critique of the global legal harmonization phenomenon
generally, see, for example, IUC Global Legal Standards Research Group, IUC
Independent Policy Report: At the End of the End of History - Global Legal
Standards: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, 9:3 GLOBAL JURIST
(2009).
24. See, e.g., IOSCO, Executive Committee, IOSCO Consultation Policy
and Procedure (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/p
df/IOSCOPD197.pdf; cf. Harlow, supra note 22, at 199–200 (“The link between
the pursuit of global administrative law and the agenda of cosmopolitan
democracy for a ‘new world order’ lies in the concept of participation.”).
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accountability25 and legitimacy.26 Others are more skeptical.27
This paper focuses on consultation as a component of policymaking, and, in particular on the different motivations and
structuring of consultations domestically and in the
transnational context to argue that it is not a simple matter to
transplant techniques from one context to another.
At the transnational level, different organizations
approach consultation and the reporting of the results of
consultation differently.28 Moreover, although transnational
standard-setters have improved the transparency and openness
of their processes, their role and activities are fundamentally
different from those of many domestic legislators and
regulators.
Transnational
standard-setters
engage
in
consultation as a concession rather than as a matter of
obligation: they are not required by any binding rules to carry
25. Accountability is a term which is used in different ways. For an
argument that we should distinguish between accountability as a virtue and
accountability as a mechanism, see Mark Bovens, Two Concepts of
Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism, 33 W. EUR.
POL. 946 (2010).
26. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative
Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006) (“While far from
ideal, the Basel process has come a long way from the purely closed ‘club’
model of its origins, and demonstrates the possibility for enhanced
accountability and legitimacy in international regulation. At the international
level, the Basel committee has recently engaged in a relatively open process
akin to a notice and comment rule-making in developing international capital
standards, and has improved its transparency. At the domestic level, central
banks and national bank regulators have enmeshed the Basel standards in the
domestic notice and comment rule-making process, enhancing the legitimacy
of the international process through local procedural protections. Moreover,
international regulatory processes, including Basel, can in some instances
help to reinforce, rather than undermine, domestic norms of accountability
and legitimacy, particularly in countries where inside elites block reforms and
prevent transparent domestic regulatory processes from occurring.”).
27. See, e.g., B.S. Chimni, Co-Option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global
Administrative Law, 37 INT’L L. & POL. 799, 800 (2008) (“By focusing
exclusively on GAL, a false impression may arise that existing international
institutions are becoming more participatory and responsive to the concerns of
developing countries and their peoples.”); see also id. at 806 (“[E]merging GAL
is an integral part of international law and institutions that have an imperial
character. As in the case of a non-democratic nation-state, non-democratic
international laws and institutions—that is, the imperial nascent global
state—cannot tolerate a robust application of principles of administrative law.
GAL is today being shaped by a transnational capitalist class that seeks to
legitimize unequal laws and institutions and deploy it to its advantage.”).
28. See generally Caroline Bradley, Private International Law-Making for
the Financial Markets, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 127, 140–154 (2005).
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out consultations at all or in any particular way. As a corollary
of this lack of obligation, stakeholders do not have meaningful
rights to be consulted. Even the EU is concerned to ensure that
its interests are taken into account in the transnational
standard-setting process.29
There are still few possibilities for challenging
transnational standards,30 and no harmonized supranational
administrative law.31 Governmental agencies are subject to
court challenges to their domestic rule-making activities,32 and
to formal review by legislatures and other governmental
agencies.33 Transnational standard-setters are not subject to
29. See, e.g., Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council
Establishing a Community Programme to Support Specific Activities in the
Field of Financial Services, Financial Reporting and Auditing, O J No. L 253/8
(Sep. 25, 2009), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.d
o?uri=OJ:L:2009:253:0008:0016:EN:PDF. Recital number 3 states: “In a global
economy, there is also a need to converge standards between jurisdictions and
develop international standards under a transparent and democratically
accountable process. It is therefore important that the Community play a role
in the international standard-setting process for financial markets. To ensure
that the interests of the Community are respected and that global standards
are of high quality and compatible with Community law, it is essential that
the interests of the Community are adequately represented in that
international standard-setting process.” Id.
30. However, the EU courts have stated that EU and Member State
authorities which implement Security Council resolutions must ensure that
EU fundamental rights are respected. See Joined Cases C-402/05 and C415.05, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council of the
European Union and Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 at
para. 314.); Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm’n, 2010 E.U.E.C.J., available at
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/EUECJ/2010/T8509.html.
31. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 15, 16 (2005) (noting “an
accountability deficit in the growing exercise of transnational regulatory
power.”).
32. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
cf. HM Government, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, 10 (U.K.
May 2010), http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf
(“We will give the public the opportunity to challenge the worst regulations.”).
Court review of administrative agency rule-making is not unproblematic,
however. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search of the
Law-Science Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 143–35 (critiquing the
courts’ reviews of rule-making and recalls by the NHTSA).
33. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-8 OCC
PREEMPTION RULEMAKING: OPPORTUNITIES EXISTED TO ENHANCE THE
CONSULTATIVE EFFORTS AND BETTER DOCUMENT THE RULEMAKING PROCESS,
5 (Oct. 17, 2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d068.pdf (“OCC does not have
written guidance, policies, or procedures detailing the rulemaking process.
Instead, OCC uses a ‘rulemaking checklist’ that serves as a guide for
completing the required reviews and the routing of documents. According to
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the same type of formal monitoring,34 and their work is
insulated from the sort of scrutiny (however imperfect) the
media apply to domestic governmental and legislative bodies.
To the extent that the transnational standards pre-empt
domestic policy choices these facts matter.
II. CONSULTATION AS AN ASPECT OF DOMESTIC
GOVERNANCE
Domestic conceptions of good government and of how
governments should relate to their citizens vary.35
Governments frequently inform36 and consult with their
citizens during the policy-making process,37 but such
consultation is carried out in various ways,38 performs a
internal control standards for the federal government, agencies should follow
written procedures in making important decisions. Without such
documentation, it may not be clear—to agency management, auditors, or
oversight committees—that an agency followed applicable requirements.”).
34. See, e.g., Chinmi, supra note 27, at 810 (“The Indian experience shows
that the role of social movements may prove particularly critical at the global
level, given the fact that judicial intervention is often not a possibility.”); cf.
Harlow, supra note 22, at 212 (“[I]n global space, power is diffused to networks
of private and public actors, escaping the painfully established controls of
democratic government and public law.”).
35. Cf. HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT
COMMITTEE, GOOD GOVERNMENT, EIGHTH REPORT OF SESSION 2008–09, H.C.
97-1, ¶ 1 (U.K. June 18, 2009) (“Good government is the professed aim of all
governments. But while everyone can agree that it is a desirable thing, it is
much harder to define what good government actually is and how to achieve
it.”).
36. The World Bank encourages communication with citizens as an aspect
of good governance. See, e.g., Helen Darbishire, Proactive Transparency: the
Future of the Right to Information?, (World Bank Institute, Governance
Working Paper Series, 2010), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGOVACC
/Resources/DarbishireProactiveTransparency.pdf.
37. Courts may treat the fact of consultation as significant. See, e.g.,
Lehman Bros. Int. (Europe) (In Administration) v. CRC Credit Fund Ltd. &
Ors., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 917 [58], [2010] WLR (D) 227, [58] (Eng.) (“The rules
should also in my judgment be taken to be grounded in reality. FSMA requires
the rules to be the subject of detailed and far-reaching consultation in the
market prior to adoption (section 155). It is thus improbable that the FSA was
oblivious to the fact that mistakes or worse are made by firms in practice, and
that serious mistakes have been made in the past. It can be assumed that the
FSA as regulator would seek to ensure that the rules ensured investment
protection even where mistakes were made.”).
38. See, e.g., HM GOVERNMENT, CODE OF PRACTICE ON CONSULTATION, 5
(U.K. July 2008), http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdf (“At times, a formal,
written, public consultation will not be the most effective or proportionate way
of seeking input from interested parties, e.g. when engaging with stakeholders
very early in policy development (preceding formal consultation) or when the
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number of different functions, and often has mixed motives.
Moreover, the differences in relationships between the
executive and legislative branches of government in different
jurisdictions influence who carries out consultations and how
they are constructed.
The UK’s Prime Minister, who is the Head of Government,
is generally the leader of the political party which has a
majority in Parliament. Through the Whip system, the
government can usually ensure the passage of legislation it
proposes. In contrast, in the US, the election of a President has
no necessary connection with majorities in Congress, and
political parties have much less power over elected
representatives. In both countries the legislature engages in
fact finding about issues and policy and about proposed
legislation through hearings. And in both countries interest
groups seek to influence legislation. But in the UK the
government has a much tighter control of the development of
broad outlines of policy than does the executive branch in the
US, and UK government departments regularly issue
consultation documents as a component of the policy
development process.39 At the same time, the UK’s ability to
make independent decisions about the development of policy is
limited by the UK’s membership of the European Union, so
although the UK government carries out some consultations
relating to its own legislative proposals, in other cases it
consults with respect to the implementation within the UK of
proposals developed in the EU.40 The UK and the US also differ
scope of an exercise is very narrow and the level of interest highly specialised.
In such cases an exercise under this Code would not be appropriate. There is,
moreover, a variety of other ways available to seek input from interested
parties other than formal consultation.”).
39. But cf., e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, FIXED-TERM PARLIAMENTS BILL, H.L. Paper 69, ¶ 19 (U.K.
Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/ldc
onst/69/69.pdf (“The speed with which the policy was introduced, with no
significant consultation, no green paper and no detailed assessment of the pros
and cons of a five year term over a four year term, suggests that short-term
considerations were the drivers behind the Bill’s introduction. The Hansard
Society argued that ‘political expediency appears to have taken priority over
Parliament’s right to properly scrutinise the executive.’ Democratic Audit
stressed that ‘this change is yet another piecemeal alteration, implemented
with insufficient consultation, to the UK constitution’.” (footnotes omitted)).
40. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, LAYING OF REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE
NEW E-MONEY DIRECTIVE: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (U.K. Oct. 2010),
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/emoney_directive_consultation.pdf.
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in the organization of their administrative or regulatory
agencies.
But, despite these structural differences in government,
different states do collect information and consult with citizens
as a component of policy-making. The global financial crisis has
led to a huge transnational fact-finding exercise, carried out by
staff at the international financial institutions41 and by states.
The US established a Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,42
and the Government Accountability Office published a number
of reports on financial regulation.43 The UK established an
Independent Commission on Banking which has stated that it
wants “to stimulate a wide debate” on reforms to the banking
sector.44 The EU Commission has emphasized that in
developing its new rules for financial regulation, “[a]ccording to
better regulation principles, the proposals are being prepared
after stakeholder consultation and impact assessments.”45
Recent trends in the UK46 and the US47 have emphasized
the idea of drawing citizens into the policy-making process
41. See, e.g., 98 OECD JOURNAL: FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS, no. 1, 2010,
passim.; INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
SOVEREIGNS,
FUNDING,
AND
SYSTEMIC
LIQUIDITY
(Oct.
2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf.
42. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was established by the
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-21, § 5, 123 Stat.
1617, 1625 (May 20, 2009). The Comission’s website is at http://www.fcic.gov/.
43. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING
PROPOSALS TO MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY
SYSTEM (Jan. 2009); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-739,
FINANCIAL CRISIS HIGHLIGHTS NEED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF LEVERAGE AT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACROSS SYSTEM (July 2009).
44. Press Release, Independent Commission on Banking, Independent
Commission on Banking: Public Events, para. 1 (Nov. 4, 2010), available at
http://bankingcommission.independent.gov.uk/bankingcommission/wpcontent/uploads/2010/10/ICB-Press-Release-6.pdf.
45. Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, at 2, COM
(2010) 301 final (June 2, 2010).
46. See, e.g., Caroline Spelman, Foreword, in AN INVITATION TO SHAPE
THE NATURE OF ENGLAND: DISCUSSION DOCUMENT, 2 (Defra ed., U.K. July
2010), http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/natural/documents/newp-discussi
on-260710.pdf (“This document is a big, open invitation to all, to help shape
the future of our natural environment, and in so doing, help shape a brighter
future for our economic prosperity and quality of life. I welcome all views and
ideas, and very much hope you will participate.”).
47. See, e.g., Memorandum of January 21, 2009, Transparency and Open
Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“Government should be
participatory. Public engagement enhances the Government’s effectiveness
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more effectively, and at an early stage in the process. And the
EU clearly envisages citizen involvement in policy development
as a way of improving public acceptance and approval of the
EU and its institutions. But although consultation seems to
reflect a governmental commitment to transparency as well as
to engagement with citizens,48 consultation documents typically
frame questions and invite responses to those questions, thus
attempting to influence how consultees engage with
government. For example, Defra, which has issued “a big open
invitation to all” to participate in the discussion about shaping
the nature of England,49 and which encourages grass roots
organizations to engage people they work with in the
discussion,50 has published documents which are designed to
guide the grass roots organizations: A Guide for Facilitators,51
and a Briefing Note for Participants.52
and improves the quality of its decisions. Knowledge is widely dispersed in
society, and public officials benefit from having access to that dispersed
knowledge. Executive departments and agencies should offer Americans
increased opportunities to participate in policymaking and to provide their
Government with the benefits of their collective expertise and information.
Executive departments and agencies should also solicit public input on how we
can increase and improve opportunities for public participation in
Government.”).
48. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, The Transparency President? The Obama
Administration and Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 535 (2009)
(“[T]ransparency can affirmatively improve governmental decision making by
helping inform the public about the problems governmental officials seek to
solve and the options they are considering. By making more information
available, the public can then participate more thoughtfully in the
governmental process . . . .”).
49. See, e.g., Spelman, supra note 46.
50. See AN INVITATION TO SHAPE THE NATURE OF ENGLAND,
http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/environment/natural/whitepaper/ (last visited Feb. 11,
2010) (“We want all interested parties to have a say in shaping the
development of the White Paper. To do this we encourage national
organisations who already have a relationship with local groups, societies,
consumers or individuals, to engage them. For example, NGOs who have local
groups or large memberships, civil society organisations who are in touch with
local civic groups, and any businesses who wish to engage their consumers on
White Paper issues.”).
51. DEFRA, AN INVITATION TO SHAPE THE NATURE OF ENGLAND: GUIDE
FOR FACILITATORS, 1 (U.K. 2010), http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/files/def-newp-facilguide.pdf (identifying “[t]he questions we would like addressed”). A feedback
form is available at http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/files/def-r13142-newp-form.doc
(last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
52. DEFRA, AN INVITATION TO SHAPE THE NATURE OF ENGLAND: BRIEFING
NOTE FOR PARTICIPANTS (U.K. 2010), http://ww2.defra.gov.uk/files/def-newpbrief-note.pdf.
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In recent years, many proposals to reform the policy
process have focused on trying to ensure that policy is evidencebased,53 and that it is considered carefully in the early stages.54
Consultation processes may be a component of evidence-based
policy-making.55 They may be designed to collect information,56
either factual information about the context for which policy is
53. See, e.g., Matthew Cashmore et al., Evaluating the Effectiveness of
Impact Assessment Instruments: Theorising the Nature and Implications of
Their Political Constitution, 30 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 371, 371
(2010) (“The principle underlying the evidence-based policy agenda is that
interventions should be based on ‘what works’ (i.e. empirical evidence of
effectiveness), rather than political belief . . . .”). There is a vast literature on
the relationship between law and science, which addresses the complexities of
the idea of evidence as a foundation for policy. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note
32.
54. See, e.g., GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 35, ¶ 57 (“The Better
Government Initiative (BGI), comprising several former senior civil servants
and government advisers, drew on their extensive experience of policy making
to suggest a range of measures which would contribute to improved
government. One key recommendation was for policy proposals to be as
comprehensive and well-thought through as possible. According to the BGI,
the policy making process should allow for effective and informed policy
deliberation, including through the publication of serious, ‘unspun’ white
papers and the provision of draft bills as a matter of course.”).
55. And some respondents to consultations urge that policy-making be
evidence-based. See, e.g., Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Comments on The
Turner Review: A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, 8 (June
18, 2009), http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/ISDA-Response-to-Turner-Reviewand-DP092.pdf (“We have no objection, of course, to product regulation being
considered, but believe that it is vital to do three things in conducting any
such exercise: 1. Recognise the level of de facto product regulation that already
exists 2. identify a clear, proportionate and evidence-based rationale for any
additional regulation, 3. work with the grain of existing industry initiatives,
notably (at the time of writing) those relating to regulatory transparency.”).
56. Governments adopt other strategies for developing policy, including
Commissions and Committees which are tasked with reviewing or developing
the law to achieve particular objectives. See, e.g., Australian Financial Centre
Forum, Australia as a Financial Centre: Building on our Strengths, (Nov.
2009) 5, http://www.treasury.gov.au/afcf/content/reference_papers/downloads/
AFCF_Building_on_Our_Strengths_Report.pdf (“On 26 September 2008, the
then Assistant Treasurer and Minister for Competition Policy and Consumer
Affairs, the Hon Chris Bowen MP, announced the establishment of the
Australian Financial Centre Forum, designed to position Australia as a
leading financial services centre. The Minister stated that the focus of the
initiative was on ensuring that Australia’s policy settings allowed the financial
sector to take full advantage of business opportunities in the region . . . . The
Minister announced the appointment of Mr Mark Johnson, retired Deputy
Chairman of Macquarie Bank, to lead the work of the Forum, along with the
establishment of a small group of senior financial sector executives to form a
Panel of Experts . . . . The Forum was further supported by the establishment
of a Reference Group of representative industry bodies.”).
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to be developed, or specific technical feedback on the details or
drafting of proposed changes. Here it must be noted that
although evidence-based policy-making is meant to be neutral
from a political perspective, the evaluation of evidence is
complex,57 and data is often manipulated to further ends which
are inherently political.58 Trade associations, think tanks, other
interest groups, and government agencies all seek to influence
the policy development process, and consultation provides fora
in which they can do so.59
Trade associations are often responsible for a substantial
proportion of contributions to consultations.60 Governments
may adopt procedures to try to ensure that the data on which
they rely in policy-making are sound.61

57. See, e.g., Cashmore et al., supra note 53, at 372 (“Evaluating
effectiveness is conceptually and methodologically problematic, and it is
arguably the case that rejuvenation of interest in, and growth in demand for,
evaluation has yet to result in significant advances being made in relation to
these issues.”).
58. Cf. D. T. Hornstein, Accounting for Science: The Independence of
Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2003, at 227, 228 (“[T]his Article identifies within
OMB's programs the expanded boundaries of a new, subterranean
battleground in administrative law, one in which the scent of future regulation
is caught by stakeholders who then battle to shape the scientific facts on
which future regulation may be based.”).
59. See, e.g., Anthony M. Bertelli & Jeffrey B. Wenger, Demanding
Information: Think Tanks and the US Congress, 39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 225, 225
(2009) (“We advance the theoretical claim that the nature of debate in
legislative committees drives a demand for strategic information, and the
benefactors of think tanks, seeing a market opportunity, create and maintain
the organizations which supply that information.”).
60. See, e.g., FSA, Short selling: Feedback on DP09/1, ¶ 1.7 (U.K. Oct.
2009), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs09_04.pdf (“There were 54
responses to DP9/01, including 17 from trade associations (or trade association
coalitions) representing the views of their members. Most of the other
responses came from authorised firms, but there were several responses both
from non-authorised firms and individuals. We thank respondents for their
comments.”).
61. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COMMITTEE, THE GOVERNMENT’S REVIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES APPLYING TO
THE TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT SCIENTIFIC ADVICE PROVIDED TO
GOVERNMENT, H.C. 158-1 (U.K. Dec. 14, 2009), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/158/15
8i.pdf. Cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-773T, SCIENTIFIC
INTEGRITY: EPA'S EFFORTS TO ENHANCE THE CREDIBILITY AND
TRANSPARENCY OF ITS SCIENTIFIC PROCESSES (June 9, 2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09773t.pdf.
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Public consultation by governments is, in any case, about
more than gathering policy-relevant data. In many technical
areas citizens may not have the necessary skills and knowledge
to evaluate properly the evidence cited as the basis for policy
proposals.62 Governments want to know not just what facts
citizens have which are relevant to policy-making, but also
what their opinions are. Governments may choose to revise63 or
to abandon policies which would be unpopular, even if they
might be effective. Often, consultations combine data-gathering
and opinion forming functions. Pre-legislative consultations
carried out by the executive allow governments to communicate
with voters about their proposals to change the law in order to
maintain confidence that they are addressing perceived
problems or keeping campaign commitments. In a sense,
therefore, some, particularly pre-legislative, consultations are
designed to improve a government’s relations with its public.64
Consultations may even be designed to manipulate public
opinions about proposed legislation.
62. See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Transparency in Public Science: Purposes,
Reasons, Limits, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2006, at 21, 24
(“[M]odern societies' increasing dependence on science has proceeded hand in
hand with developments that disable most citizens, even the most technically
expert, from effectively addressing the larger set of questions: Is it good
science; what is it good for; and is it good enough? Science has not only become
infused with multiple social and political interests; it is also in danger of
escaping effective critical control. Too often scientific knowledge seems to be
‘sequestered,’ concealed from those who could benefit from it or who could
comment meaningfully on its quality and relevance.”).
63. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS REGULATORY REFORM COMMITTEE,
DRAFT LEGISLATIVE REFORM (REVOCATION OF PRESCRIBED FORM OF PENALTY
NOTICE FOR DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR) ORDER 2009, H.C. 1108, ¶ 12 (U.K. Nov.
18, 2009), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cm
select/cmdereg/1108/1108.pdf (“The rationale of the response is essentially
that the Department did not want to delay, but was unable to lay the draft
Order immediately after consultation because consultation had shown the
proposal to be more controversial than expected. That rather misses the point
that a principal purpose of consultation is to establish whether there are views
on a policy that might cause it to be reconsidered.”).
64. See, e.g., BIS, The Insolvency Service, Encouraging Company Rescue –
a consultation, ¶ 2 (June 15, 2009) [hereinafter Rescue Consultation],
available at http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/c
on_doc_register/ (“The UK has a long established and well developed
insolvency legislative framework, which is highly regarded worldwide, with a
reputation for fairness and for striking the right balance between the interests
of debtors and creditors. We want to ensure that the insolvency regime
remains world class and fit for purpose and this consultation is part of that
ongoing process.”).
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These two main functions of consultations (relationship
oriented and fact oriented) operate together in the context of
domestic politics, and sometimes may blur together. A concern
for facts and evidence to support policy may lead governments
to over-emphasize the comments of those who appear to have
expertise when they weigh responses to consultations. For
example, reports have raised questions about whether
governmental authorities were too willing to accept financial
institutions’ claims about their ability to assess and manage
the risks associated with their operations in developing rules of
financial regulation.65
At the domestic level, consultations may be structured
differently at different stages in the policy-development
process. Consultation exercises may be presented as
preliminary, for example being denominated as discussions
rather than consultations.66 Governments may set up groups of
experts to provide advice in particular policy areas.67 Data
gathering consultations may be carried out by congressional or
parliamentary committees at an early stage before the
consideration of proposed legislation,68 or in the context of
specific legislative proposals. When governments publish
documents setting out their proposals for new legislation they
may seek data from the public about the likely impact of the
proposals.69 Government-generated impact assessments and
65. See, e.g., The Turner Review, supra note 7.
66. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, DISCUSSION PAPER ON DEVELOPING NONBANK LENDING CHANNELS FOR UK BUSINESSES (Jan. 12, 2010), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/non_bank_lending_discussionpaper.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t for Bus., Innovation & Skills Press
Release, Business Secretary Vince Cable today announced the creation of a
new group of experts to advise him on business and economic policy (May 18,
2010) (on file with author), available at http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/Detail.asp
x?ReleaseID=413396&NewsAreaID=2.
68. See, e.g., HOUSE OF LORDS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SELECT
COMMITTEE, CALL FOR EVIDENCE: BEHAVIOUR CHANGE (July 29, 2010),
available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/sciencetechnology/behaviourchange/CfEBehaviourChange.pdf.
69. See, e.g., Rescue Consultation, supra note 64, at 8 (“A1. Do you agree
that it would be helpful for medium and large-sized companies to be allowed to
benefit from the option of a moratorium from creditor action for up to 28 days?
A2. How useful do you think this would be? Do you think it would encourage
medium and large-sized companies to utilise the CVA procedure? (If you can
give figures, or comment on those in the initial Impact Assessment, that would
be helpful.)”).
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cost-benefit analyses70 may also be communicated to the public
in the course of consultations. In times of emergency
governments may limit their consultations in the interests of
speedy rule-making.71
Pre-legislative consultations may raise broad issues of
principle for discussion. However, pre-legislative consultations
on measures to implement supranational rules or standards
are less likely to raise such broad issues. Although
governmental authorities do sometimes carry out domestic
consultations while they are negotiating transnational
standards,72 this is not inevitable. So, at the time of
implementation the Government carrying out the consultation
may have already committed itself to the fact of
implementation, although it may have retained some discretion
with respect to the modalities of implementation.
Implementation consultations will therefore reflect any limits
on discretion with respect to implementation that are inherent
in the supranational rules or standards. As noted above,
governments may have limited discretion in implementation
either as a legal matter, because the rules by their terms limit
discretion, or as a practical matter because of political rather
70. See,
e.g.,
UK
GOV’T’S
IMPACT
ASSESSMENT
LIBRARY,
http://www.ialibrary.berr.gov.uk/; see also, e.g., European Ct. of Auditors,
Impact Assessments In the EU Institutions: Do They Support DecisionMaking? 24 (Special Report No. 3 2010) available at http://eca.europa.eu/porta
l/pls/portal/docs/1/5412743.PDF (“Public scrutiny of legislative proposals is of
the utmost importance in relation to the policy objective of better regulation.
The Commission's final IA reports are public documents available online to all
interested parties once the related policy initiative has been proposed. This is
international good practice.”).
71. Cf. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FAST-TRACK
LEGISLATION: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND SAFEGUARDS, REPORT
2008-09, H.L. 116–
I, ¶ 163 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld20080
9/ldselect/ldconst/116/116.pdf (“We . . . urge the Government to put
mechanisms in place to ensure that relevant parliamentary committees and
stakeholders are consulted about and given the opportunity to respond to
proposed fast-track legislation ahead of Second Reading in the House in which
the bill is introduced. This should be possible in all but the most extreme
circumstances.”).
72. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, REVISION OF THE E-MONEY DIRECTIVE AND
EU REGULATION ON CROSS-BORDER PAYMENTS: A CONSULTATION, 3 (Jan. 20,
2009) available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100407010852/
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_emd_200109.pdf (“This document
consults on both proposals, with a view to informing the Government approach
towards EU level negotiations on revision of the EMD, and the
implementation of a revised Regulation 2560 into UK law.”).
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than legal commitments. Governmental authorities may ask
potential commenters how they should go about meeting their
obligations to implement the supranational rules.73 And they
may even consult on implementation in circumstances where
they have limited discretion. For many reasons consultation at
the time of implementation of transnational standards may
have a limited impact on the implementing measures.
Consultations about implementation may come to resemble
domestic regulatory consultations which, reflecting the limited
rule-making powers of the regulatory agency, concentrate on
relatively narrow, more technical questions.
III. CONSULTATION IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
When governments work together in different fora to
generate agreements about standards and rules that should
operate transnationally, they do so using processes which are
not uniform, which often seem to develop in an ad hoc manner,
and which do not necessarily reflect any particular conception
of good government. A growing literature on global
administrative law seeks to address deficiencies in rule-making
and standard-setting at the supranational level.74 This
literature tends to take as a given that supranational standardsetting is analogous to regulation rather than legislation at the
domestic level.75 However, although supranational standard73. See, e.g., HM TREASURY, PUBLIC CONSULTATION: DRAFT TERRORIST
ASSET-FREEZING BILL, 2010, Cm. 7852 4, available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/consult_terrorist_assetfreezing_bill.pdf (“The Government is
committed to ensuring that there is full and effective scrutiny of its draft asset
freezing legislation. As such, it is launching this public consultation exercise to
seek the views of interested parties and the general public on our proposed
approach to terrorist asset freezing. In particular, the Government is
interested in responses to the following questions:• does the draft Bill set out
the most effective way of meeting our UN obligations and protecting national
security whilst also ensuring sufficient safeguards in respect of human
rights?”).
74. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17
(2005) (defining “global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms,
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or
otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in
particular by ensuring they meet adequate standards of transparency,
participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective
review of the rules and decisions they make.”).
75. See, e.g., Harlow, supra note 22, at 196 (“The principles of agency
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setting may seem to take on the form of administrative
processes, it also operates at a more fundamental policy-setting
level.76 Even where supranational standard-setters develop
highly technical standards, those standards may embed policy
assumptions, and they may have significant impacts on the
lives of citizen-voters around the world.
The generation of supranational standards may be
intended to prevent national governments from making policy
choices which diverge from the standards, and may in fact
preclude such divergent choices.77 For example, the 1988 Basel
Capital Adequacy Accord required states to impose capital
adequacy requirements on international banks, even if those
states addressed risks to financial stability in other ways. The
Accord was agreed after the US and the UK announced they
would apply stringent capital adequacy requirements to foreign
banks doing business in their jurisdictions.78
Thus transnational standard-setting is arguably analogous
to domestic political consultations, involving choices between
goals, rather than to technical domestic regulatory
consultations where the objective is to identify the best way of
regulating to achieve a goal mandated by a statute. However,
the transnational standard-setters are networks of bureaucrats
rather than political bodies. And, although supranational
and delegation are used to legitimate regulatory standard-setting in global
space.”).
76. For example, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision develops
technical standards for capital adequacy but has also set out what it regards
as the core necessary elements of banking regulation. See BIS, Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision (Oct. 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.pdf and
BIS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework—Comprehensive
Version
(June
2006),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf.
77. Cf. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, A Postfunctionalist Theory of
European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,
39 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2 (2009) (“Governance is a means to achieve collective
benefits by co-ordinating human activity. Given the variety of public goods and
their varying externalities, efficient governance will be multi-level. But
governance is also an expression of community. Citizens care—passionately—
about who exercises authority over them. The challenge for a theory of multilevel governance is that the functional need for human co-operation rarely
coincides with the territorial scope of community.”).
78. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International
Financial Regulation, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 447, 500–03 (2008).
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standards and rules may reduce the discretion of national
governments, and thus would seem to imply a more general,
principle-focused consultation, transnational consultations tend
to resemble domestic regulatory, rather than pre-legislative,
consultations. In this context the EU, with parliamentary
representation of citizens as an aspect of the policy
development process, is more like a domestic government than
more technocratic bodies such as the Basel Committee and
IOSCO. The EU’s policy development process includes the
publication of Green Papers, White Papers, Communications,79
and other pre-legislative consultative documents which solicit
comments on general policy issues.80 Other supranational and
transnational organizations may respond to the EU’s
consultations.81
Transnational standard-setters such as the Basel
Committee and IOSCO are structured as groupings or
networks of domestic regulators.82 Thus the standardsdevelopment process they are engaged in is qualitatively
different from that of a legislative or governmental body. But it
may also be different from that of a domestic regulatory body
79. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission Reinforcing Economic
Policy Coordination, COM (2010) 250 final (May 12, 2010) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/euro/documents/2010-05-12-com%
282010%29250_final.pdf.
80. Cf. Mario Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market: At the Service
of Europe’s Economy and Society, Report to the President of the European
Commission, José Manuel Barroso 17 (May 9, 2010) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf
(“Before
launching the single market project with the 1985 White Paper, Jacques
Delors had prepared the initiative through a "tour des capitales" of the then 10
Member States, plus Spain and Portugal who were soon to join. Today the
European Union is not only larger and more diverse, with its 27 Member
States, but also more complex in its articulation, with a much broader
involvement of stakeholders and civil society.”).
81. See, e.g., IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Europe, Fostering
Sustainability, 21 n.4 (May 2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pu
bs/ft/reo/2010/EUR/eng/ereo0510.pdf (“The consultation documents, including
the IMF’s staff contributions, are available on DG Markt’s website:
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/crisis_management/index_en.htm#consult
ation; and ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2009/deposit_guarantee
_schemes_en.htm .”).
82. On governance networks, see, for example, Carolyn M. Hendriks, The
Democratic Soup: Mixed Meanings of Political Representation in Governance
Networks, 22 GOVERNANCE 689 (2009). Hendriks examines the enactment of
representation in a governance network around energy reform in the
Netherlands in terms of dramaturgy and rhetoric. Id. at 693–4.
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engaged in domestic rule-making. Regulators may not have
formal rule-making powers as a matter of domestic law,83 but
their limited domestic responsibilities may not effectively limit
their ability to participate in transnational standard-setting.84
More generally, even where domestic regulators have rulemaking powers, these powers are constrained by statute.
Regulators may not feel themselves to be constrained in the
same way when they participate in transnational standardsetting.
In normal times, and to the extent that transnational
standard-setting is really a process of identifying best practices
based on what national regulatory systems prescribe, such that
regulators with limited domestic functions do no more than
represent the characteristics of their domestic systems in the
transnational processes, the idea of constrained domestic
regulators functioning as the articulators of transnational
standards seems relatively unproblematic. If, on the other
hand, constrained domestic regulators see their role in the
context of transnational standard-setting as being the
development of standards which differ from those they are
charged to administer, this is more problematic.85 And in the
aftermath of the crisis transnational standard-setters are
clearly doing more than just distilling current best practices

83. See, e.g., Julia Black & Stéphane Jacobzone, Tools for Regulatory
Quality and Financial Sector Regulation: A Cross-Country Perspective 9
(OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, Paper No. 16, 2009), available
at http://oecd.org (“The greatest variation is with respect to rule making
powers, where OSFI and ASIC lack powers to make binding rules, yet in
contrast the FSA, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), for example, have
extensive rule making powers exercised independently of the executive.”).
Although Australian Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) does not
have the power to make regulations it does have the power to issue regulatory
guidance and regulatory relief. See, e.g., ASIC,ASIC: A Guide to Our
Regulatory Documents: An ASIC Better Regulation Initiative, (June 2007) 5,
available at http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/ASIC_G
uide_to_regulatory_docs.pdf/$file/ASIC_Guide_to_regulatory_docs.pdf.
84. As of May 12, 2010 Tony D'Aloisio, the Chairman of ASIC, was a
member of IOSCO’s Presidents’ Committee, Executive Committee and of its
Technical Committee.
85. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to
Regulatory Competition, 52 EMORY L. J. 1353, 1354 (2003) (suggesting that
regulators may engage in “regulatory globalization” to make it difficult for
local opponents to block policy changes the regulator’s favours).
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into transnational standards: they are developing new rules for
the transnational financial system.
The idea that the role of transnational standard-setters
has evolved from a positive role of describing existing best
practices to a normative function of identifying what best
practices should be raises new questions about the role of
consultation in the transnational context. Supranational
standard-setters have turned to consultation to enhance their
perceived legitimacy, to inform their work, and to make those
affected by their standards more receptive to them.86 Some
have argued that shifting decision-making to multilateral
institutions can improve democracy, rather than undermine
it.87 But transnational consultations as currently structured
suffer from numerous weaknesses which undermine their value
as mechanisms of legitimization.
Transnational consultations lack visibility; they are
usually carried out in a limited number of languages, or even
only in English. They state that they are aimed at
stakeholders, which likely reflects their limited visibility and
the aim of achieving buy-in by those likely to be most affected
by the standards. But this stakeholder emphasis also implies
that there may be others (non-stakeholders) whose views are
less important. As the financial crisis has shown, it is not only
those who consider themselves to be stakeholders in financial
regulation who are affected by its failures.
If one takes the view that what matters in the context of
standard-setting is the identification of optimal rules, limited
consultation of those with relevant expertise might be
appropriate. However, if one takes the view that there are no
optimal substantive rules, but perhaps only optimal or good
enough processes for identifying rules, the structure of
consultation is critical. Better Regulation agendas88 involve
86. See, e.g., IOSCO Executive Committee, IOSCO Consultation Policy
and Procedure (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/p
df/IOSCOPD197.pdf .
87. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo & Andrew Moravcsik,
Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism, 63 INT’L ORG. 1 (2009). The authors
state that a “[M]ultilateral institutions can empower diffuse minorities against
special-interest factions, protect vulnerable individuals and minorities, and
enhance the epistemic quality of democratic decision making in wellestablished democratic states.” Id. at 26.
88. See, e.g., Commission Action Plan: Simplifying and Improving the
Regulatory Environment, COM (2002) 278 (June 5, 2002) available at
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aspects of both of these views: the emphasis on evidence-based
policy-making89 suggests that the objective of identifying the
right rules is key, whereas focusing on transparency and
accountability involves a concern for process.90
The legitimacy of global governance clearly involves a wide
range of issues apart from those relating to how consultation is
carried out with respect to proposals for new standards and
rules. The financing of standard-generating bodies also has
implications for the perceived legitimacy of their standards.91
The structure and composition of decision-making bodies raise
complex and controversial issues.
Supranational standard-setters are evolving their own
governance principles and codes of consultation. The EU with
its complex institutional structures has a closer resemblance to
a federal government than other supranational standardsetters, and has focused greater attention on issues of

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0278:FIN:
EN:PDF [hereinafter Action Plan]; Commission Report on Better Regulation
for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, COM (2005) 97 (Mar. 2005) at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0097:FIN:
EN:PDF. More recently, policy makers have been promoting smart regulation.
See, e.g., Commission Report on Stakeholder Consultation on Smart
Regulation (Apr. 23, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_
regulation/smart_regulation/docs/smart_regulation_consultation_en.pdf
[hereinafter Smart Regulation].
89. See, e.g., GOOD GOVERNMENT, supra note 35, at 25 (“Processes for
preparing and scrutinising policy and legislation should be as thorough and
well-informed as possible, in the interests of good government.”). Impact
assessment is a component of better regulation. See, e.g., Action Plan, supra
note 88, at 7.
90. See, e.g., Commission Consultation Document: Towards a Reinforced
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue - Proposal for General Principles and
Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission,
COM
(2002)
277
(June
5,
2002)
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2002:0277:FIN:EN:PDF.
The Commission notes that “good consultation serves a double purpose by
helping to improve the quality of the policy outcome and at the same time
enhancing the involvement of interested parties and the public at large.” Id. at
5.
91. Cf. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, WORK PLAN FOR THE CONSIDERATION
OF INCORPORATING INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS INTO
THE FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM FOR U.S. ISSUERS 17 (Oct. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/globalaccountingstandards/workplan
progress102910.pdf (“In the 2010 Statement, the Commission recognized the
importance of independent funding to support a standard-setting process free
of undue influence for the ultimate benefit of investors.”). In 2010 the
International Accounting Standards Board faced a funding shortfall.
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governance92 and consultation.93 Consultation is a significant
element of policy-making in the EU:
[W}ide consultation of stakeholders and in-depth impact assessments
prior to legislative proposals . . . help to ensure that proper account is
taken of the concerns of citizens and of all interested parties. They
make essential contributions to implementing the Commission’s
‘better lawmaking’ policy.94

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has recently
expanded its membership (twice)95 to reflect concerns that a
body representing only a small fraction of the world’s banking
regulators and central banks would not have the legitimate
authority to set standards for banking regulation for the world.
Similarly, the IMF is reviewing its governance arrangements.96
IV. STRUCTURING CONSULTATIONS: WEAKNESSES IN
THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL
CONSULTATIONS
Although transnational standard-setters have increased
their emphasis on consultation as a mechanism of legitimation,
consultations carried out by the Basel Committee and IOSCO
lack some of the critical characteristics of domestic
consultations. Transnational standard-setters work towards
92. Commission White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001) 428
final (July 25, 2001).
93. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission Towards a Reinforced
Culture of Consultation and Dialogue—General Principles and Minimum
Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, 10, COM
(2002) 704 (Dec. 11, 2002).
94. Commission Green Paper: European Transparency Initiative, 2, COM
(2006) 194 (May 3, 2006).
95. See Press Release, BIS, The Basel Committee Broadens its
Membership (June 10, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090610.ht
m (announcing invitation to join the Committee to Argentina, Indonesia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, Hong Kong and Singapore); Press
Release, BIS, Expansion of Membership Announced by the Basel Committee
(Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm
(announcing invitation to join the Committee to Australia, Brazil, China,
India, Korea, Mexico and Russia).
96. See Comm. on IMF Governance Reform, Final Report, 6 (Mar. 24,
2009), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/2009/govref/032409.pdf
(“[U]ntil the Fund is viewed as legitimate and appropriate for the discussion
and resolution of global macroeconomic issues, it will remain peripheral and
unable to achieve the overall stability mandate envisaged by its founders and
shareholders.”). See also, e.g., IMF Invites Civil Society Input Into Governance
Reform, INT’L MONETARY FUND (June 26, 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/p
ubs/ft/survey/so/2009/NEW062509A.htm.
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agreement on standards within their own networks, rather
than on ensuring a broader acceptance of their work. In
practice, public participation in consultations by transnational
financial standard-setters is limited.97 And, whereas public
participation by citizens of developed countries is limited,
citizens of less developed countries are even less likely to
participate.98
There are a number of reasons for the low levels of public
participation. For example, many domestic consultations on
financial regulation, transnational consultations on standards
are framed in a way that makes the views of non-experts seem
irrelevant. In addition, and perhaps in contrast to domestic
consultations, they are not designed to be visible and/or
accessible. The Basel Committee’s work is not reliably front
page news. A recent article in the New York Times business
section described Nout Wellink as “chairman of a prominent
panel that is rewriting global banking regulations.”99 And the
Basel Committee does not go out of its way to make it easy for
commenters to make their views known. For example, although
the press release announcing the publication of the Basel
Committee/IADI’s “Consultative Document” on Core Principles
for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems did indicate where
comments could be sent,100 the consultative document itself did
not contain requests for comments, or even any indication as to
where comments could be sent.101 This does not seem to be an
97. See, e.g., Barr & Miller, supra note 26, at 26 (“The role of the broader
public was relatively muted, which reflected in part the technical nature of the
Basel Committee’s work and the fact that for most public-interested
organizations, the connection between banking standards and broader social
concerns was not pronounced.”)
98. Cf. Chimni, supra note 27, at 800–01 (“[A]t the international level a
participatory structure has meaning only if third world states and relevant
NGOs are provided with the financial and technical assistance necessary to
effectively participate in the work of an international body.”).
99. Jack Ewing, A Banker Unafraid to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010,
at B4.
100. Press Release, BIS, Basel Committee and IADI Issue Core Principles
for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems for Public Consultation (Mar. 12,
2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090312a.htm.
101. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision & Int’l Ass’n of Deposit
Insurers, Consultative Document: Core Principles for Effective Deposit
Insurance
Systems
(Mar.
2009),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs151.pdf. Contra, e.g., IOSCO Technical Comm.,
Regulatory Implementation of the Statement of Principles Regarding the
Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, 2–3 (May 2010), available at
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enthusiastic general invitation to comment. The Basel
Committee also has not typically recognized comments in its
final articulations of standards. However, in the wake of the
financial crisis the Basel Committee has published comment
letters on its website.102 Transnational standard-setters have
not adopted standard practices with respect to publicizing the
results of their consultations, and incorporating the results of
consultations into announcements of final standards.
It should be noted that the lack of standard practices for
publication of comments and reflection of comments in final
standards at the supranational level has an effect. It
demonstrates a lack of uniform practice which is visible in
domestic regulatory systems. Agencies in the US are working
towards transparency,103 but there is still some visible
variation. Whereas the SEC has published comments on
proposed rule-makings on its website for some time, the
Federal Reserve Board only publishes comments on some of its
regulatory proposals on its website.104 Citizens have the right
to access comments that are part of the rule-making docket, but
it can take effort to achieve access. In their final rules, agencies
do not necessarily disclose even the identity of commenters.105
The UK’s Financial Services Authority summarizes responses
to consultations in its policy documents.106
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD319.pdf (identifying three
possible means of communicating views on the document).
102. See Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Comments Received on the
Consultative Documents "Countercyclical Capital Buffer Proposal," BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS (last visited Feb.20, 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs17
2/cacomments.htm.
103. See,
e.g.,
the
regulations.gov
website
at
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#home.
104. See FED. RESERVE BD.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2011) (allowing for comments to be made to certain proposals only).
105. See, e.g., Electronic Fund Transfers, 75 Fed. Reg. 66644, 66645 (Oct.
29, 2010) (“The Board received two comments on the interim final rule from a
credit union trade association and a bankers’ trade association. Both
commenters generally supported the interim final rule. The bankers’ trade
association suggested that the Board exercise its exception authority to
eliminate in-store disclosures where cards sold meet the final gift card rule’s
substantive fee and expiration date protections. This commenter also
requested an extension of the delayed effective date. No other comments were
received. The final rule adopts the interim final rule as issued, with minor
non-substantive edits.”).
106. See, e.g., FSA, Effective Corporate Governance: Significant Influence
Controlled Functions and the Walker Review, 9–35, PS10/15 (Sept. 24, 2010),
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The transnational standard-setters could take advantage
of some of the work of the EU Commission, which regularly
reviews its consultation practices with a view to improving
them.107 The EU Commission has recently attempted to make
some consultations more visible by publishing citizen
summaries of consultations (although it is not clear that this
has been very effective),108 and has even dedicated financial
resources to the development of effective stakeholder groups.109
The EU’s internal focus on developing effective consultations
with stakeholders may effectively pressurize transnational
standard-setters to reform their own consultation practices. For
example, the Commission has noted that because transnational
consultation processes (like domestic consultations) may not
effectively reflect the views of all stakeholders, governments
may decide that it is their function to represent the public
interest.110
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps10_15.pdf (summarizing
feedback and responses).
107. See, e.g., Smart Regulation, supra note 88, at 3 (“What concrete
improvements could the Commission make to ensure that all relevant
stakeholders are aware of and able to participate in consultations? Are there
particular forms of consultation which you found useful when taking part in
the Commission consultations (open internet questionnaires, stakeholder
meetings, public hearings)?”).
108. See, e.g., European Union Comm’n, Communication on an EU
Framework for Cross-border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector, COM
(2009)
561
final
(Oct.
20,
2009),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0561:FIN:EN:PDF
[hereinafter Crisis Management Consultation]; see also European Union
Comm’n, Citizens’ Summary, Commission Communication on an EU
Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Banking Sector (Oct.
2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/crisis-management/0910
20_citicens_summary_en.pdf. The full consultation document raised some
quite technical policy issues and is seventeen pages long. The summary is two
pages long, and seems to be designed to persuade citizens that the EU is
taking action rather than about trying to solicit meaningful comments from
the public.
109. This strategy is not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Andrew Rettman, EUfunded Think Tanks Defend Their Credibility, EU OBSERVER (Jan. 29, 2010),
http://euobserver.com/9/29368.
110. European Union Comm’n, Internet Governance: The Next Steps, at 4,
COM (2009) 277 final (Jun. 18, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/informat
ion_society/policy/internet_gov/docs/communication/comm2009_277_fin_en.pdf
(“Private-sector leadership in the construction and day-to-day management of
the Internet that we know today has worked well. As noted before, this
private-sector initiative must be maintained. But non-governmental
stakeholders must recognise that Internet users worldwide—most of whom do
not participate and are not otherwise represented in Internet governance

BRADLEY - Final Version

2011]

TRANSNATIONAL STANDARD-SETTING

4/22/2011 6:13 PM

507

One major way in which transnational consultations differ
from domestic consultations is that the transnational standardsetters do not necessarily seek to communicate with
stakeholders in the stakeholders’ own languages. Whereas
governments of multi-lingual populations communicate with
their citizens and residents in their own languages (although
probably more frequently with respect to the provision of
services111 than with respect to consultation), transnational
consultations on proposed standards are usually conducted in a
limited number of languages,112 if not solely in English.
Although the EU makes efforts to communicate with EU
citizens in their own languages, such efforts are costly, and
even EU institutions publish consultation documents in a
limited number of languages.113 Commentators on the IMF’s
transparency policy urged that the IMF should translate more
of its documents into languages other than English.114 ISDA
may be able to communicate its views in Romanian,115 but
fora—have a legitimate expectation that their governments will guarantee
that any current or future governance arrangements will reflect the public
interest of society as a whole and will not be subject to capture by narrow
commercial or regional interests. Private-sector leadership and effective
public policies are not mutually exclusive.”).
111. And even in the context of service delivery agencies may not provide
adequate language assistance services. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-91, SELECTED AGENCIES CAN IMPROVE SERVICES TO LIMITED
ENGLISH
PROFICIENT
PERSONS
12
(2010),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1091.pdf (“Because SBA provides both
business development services as well as disaster-recovery assistance that
require different language access services, SBA should use DOJ’s guidance to
help it complete its LEP plan and recipient guidance consistent with SBA’s
specific requirements.”).
112. The BIS publishes some documents in languages other than English.
FOR
INT’L
SETTLEMENTS,
BIS—Other
Publications,
See
BANK
http://www.bis.org/publ/other.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2011) (listing a
number of documents in languages other than English).
113. The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), for example,
consults in English. See EUROPEAN SEC. AND MARKETS AUTH., Consultations,
http://www.esma.europa.eu/index.php?page=consultation&mac=0&id=
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2011) (listing the details of consultations as well as responses
in English).
114. IMF, Consultation Roundtable on IMF Transparency: Summary of
Comments
from
Civil
Society
Organizations
(Feb.
11,
2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2009/052809.htm (“There should be
more translation of documents into languages other than English.”).
115. See ISDA, Susţinerea reformei legislative în România privind
compensarea bilaterală (netting) şi garanţiile financiare (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/RO_ISDA_Ltr_NBR_Oct10.pdf (Rom.).
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Romanians may not all be capable of communicating their
views on financial regulation in English.
Consultations are targeted at particular groups in a
number of different ways. Consultation documents may be sent
to particular people, signaling that their responses will be
valued, and roundtables and meetings may be set up to
encourage particular people and firms to give their feedback. In
a less intrusive way, drafters of consultation documents
sometimes identify specific categories of potential respondents
as stakeholders,116 or they may construct different consultation
documents or response forms for different groups. These
documents may ask different questions of different groups. For
example, when the IMF sought views about its transparency
policy it required commentators to categorize themselves as
civil society organizations, financial markets participants or
“think tanks, academics and other stakeholders.” The
questionnaires were different for the different groups. For
example, whereas civil society organizations and think tanks
were asked their views about whether IMF transparency
should be improved by making reports easier to understand,
more timely, more frank, or easier to access, financial markets
participants were not asked this question.117
The identification of specific stakeholders in consultation
documents may imply that there may be others (nonstakeholders) whose views are less important. As such, a
consultation document which refers to stakeholders as those
who are subject to a regulatory regime, rather than those whom
it should benefit, seems to imply that the views of the
beneficiaries of the regime are unimportant.118
116. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS, CIVIL
SANCTIONS PILOT: A CONSULTATION ON THE PILOT OPERATION OF CIVIL
SANCTION POWERS FOR CONSUMER LAW ENFORCERS, URN 10/706, at 2,
http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/corporate/docs/c/10-706-civil-sanctionspilot.pdf (U.K.) (“This consultation is relevant to: consumer representative
bodies; businesses; business representative bodies; consumer law enforcers.”).
117. See IMF, IMF Seeks Views on its Transparency Policy (Feb. 11, 2010),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/trans/2009/index.htm (providing opinion
questionnaires for civil society organizations, financial market participants,
and think tanks only).
118. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE ET AL., Debt Management Schemes—
Delivering Effective and Balanced Solutions for Debtors and Creditors,
CP09/09, at 10, available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/debtmanagement-schemes.pdf (“In developing these proposals, we have listened to
the views of a wide range of stakeholders from the credit and advice sectors,
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Although much of financial regulation is complex and
technical there are aspects of financial regulation which involve
combinations of issues which are technical and of little interest
to consumers, and issues which are directly relevant to
consumers.119
Whether
transnational
standard-setters
emphasize the technical aspects or the consumer aspects may
have a significant impact on consumers’ interests.
Transnational consultations which are framed as technical
exercises through a combination of the specific questions which
are asked and the identification of particular groups of relevant
stakeholders tend to undermine the legitimacy of the
consultation as an element in the production of standards,
especially those standards which eliminate discretion in
implementation. Consumers and the organizations which
represent their interests are more likely than financial firms to
be excluded from effective participation in supranational
standard-setting due to the combined effects of opaque
processes, framing, and lack of resources.
The approaches of transnational standard-setters to
publicizing the results of consultations vary. Although some
Basel Committee publications do not give much information at
all about responses to consultations,120 the BIS has begun to
publish comment letters on its website.121 IOSCO generally
prefers to characterize the comments it receives,122 although it
current operators from both the not-for-profit and commercial sectors and
other Government Departments. This consultation provides the opportunity to
comment further.”).
119. Some issues are of high salience for consumers. See, for example,
Federal Reserve, Notice of Study and Request for Information, 69 Fed. Reg.
29308, May 21, 2004, and the comments submitted in response to this request
for information about debit card fees, which are available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/index.cfm?doc_id=OP%2D1196
&doc_ver=1&ShowAll=Yes.
120. See, e.g., Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision & Int’l Ass’n of Deposit
Insurers, Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (June 2009),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs156.pdf.
121. See, e.g., Basal Comm. on Banking Supervision, Comments Received
on the Consultative Documents "Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking
Sector" and "International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement,
Standards and Monitoring," BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (last visited
Feb.20, 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/cacomments.htm.
122. See, e.g., IOSCO Technical Comm., Regulatory Implementation of the
Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies, 8
(June 2009), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD29
2.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO Hedge Funds Report] (“Having considered the public
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does sometimes refer to commenters by name.123 Respondents
may (and often do) publish their responses on their own web
sites.124 In domestic regulatory systems courts may review the
record on which regulators act, but this type of review does not
exist in the context of transnational standard-setting. This lack
of a mechanism for judicial review of transnational standardsetting (especially the setting of standards which allow for
limited discretion in implementation) suggests that the
procedures for setting standards should be even more
transparent and open than domestic law-making procedures
which are subject to review. Transnational consultation
systems where standard-setters voluntarily set their own
principles for consultation and for the reporting of the results of
consultation with no accountability to voters or through judicial
review are problematic, particularly when they produce
standards which limit domestic rule-makers’ discretion.
V. CONCLUSIONS: IMPROVING CONSULTATION
Fixing transnational consultation is not easy, and it will be
costly, but it is important to ensure that consultation of citizens
comments received on the Consultation Report, the IOSCO Technical
Committee has developed the six high level principles below which should be
applied to the regulation of hedge funds.”). In addition the IOSCO Hedge
Funds Report has an annex reporting on the results of the consultation, and
conclusions in light of responses. Id. at 17–23. In some cases the IOSCO Hedge
Funds Report refers to the responses of specific entities with attribution. Id. at
19 (“Considering the international dimension of the hedge funds activities, all
respondents supported the need for more convergence on the regulation of
hedge fund managers in order to minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage and
ensure better level playing field. See, e.g., International Council of Securities
Associations’ Public Response to the IOSCO Consultation Report on Hedge
Funds Oversight.”). But comments are not always attributed to particular
respondents. Id. at 20 (“One respondent challenged that the wider publication
of details on business plan and fees charged could create commercial problems
for the managers.”).
123. See, e.g., IOSCO Hedge Funds Report, supra note 122, at 19
(“Considering the international dimension of the hedge funds activities, all
respondents supported the need for more convergence on the regulation of
hedge fund managers in order to minimise the risk of regulatory arbitrage and
ensure better level playing field. See, e.g., International Council of Securities
Associations’ Public Response to the IOSCO Consultation Report on Hedge
Funds Oversight.”).
124. See, e.g., Letter from Jonathan Taylor & Duncan Fairweather,
Chairmen at the ICSA, to Greg Tanzer, Secretary General of IOSCO (Apr. 30,
2009), available at http://www.icsa.bz/pdf/ICSA-Letter-IOSCOreHedgeFundsApr09.pdf.
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about the rules which affect their lives is not a mere formality.
One of the most difficult issues relates to language diversity.
English-only or limited language consultations exclude those
who do not know the languages of consultation. But, as the EU
has found, translation involving large numbers of languages
can be very expensive. Apart from the translation issue, some
techniques which can increase publicity for proposals about
regulation at the domestic level may work differently at the
transnational level. Open meetings125 benefit those with the
resources to travel, and international travel is often more
expensive than domestic travel. Standard-setters and
international organizations can decide to commit financial
resources to facilitate participation in consultation by groups
representing those without adequate means. For example, the
EU finances NGOs, and there is a codex alimentarius trust
fund to enable developing country participation.126
Taking steps to help consumers and consumer groups to
participate in consultations as stakeholders may not in fact
enhance the legitimacy of the process if consumers’ views are
only sought with respect to issues identified in advance as
consumer issues or where the standard-setter assumes that
consumer stakeholders will be relatively uninformed so that
their views can be discounted. And whereas limiting the ways
in which stakeholders can respond to consultations makes it
easier and cheaper for standard-setters to process responses,127
125. See, e.g., Crisis Management Consultation, supra note 108, at 17 (“The
Commission plans to organise a public hearing in early 2010 in order to
present the results of the consultation and to set out how it intends to proceed.
This will feed into the preparation of a roadmap of follow up initiatives in the
areas of early intervention, resolution and insolvency in order to build a crisis
management framework that would ensure that, in future, all competent
authorities effectively coordinate their actions and have the appropriate tools
for intervening quickly to manage the failure of a bank.”).
126. Cf. Chimni, supra note 27, at 815 (“While the Trust Fund is certainly
a step in the right direction, it remains to be seen whether it will have enough
resources to meet its objectives. India, for example, has expressed concern that
the broad goals of the Trust Fund, which include the transformation of
domestic practices rather than simply promoting greater participation of
developing countries, may, given the Fund’s meager resources, mean that the
objective of promoting greater participation may suffer.”).
127. See, e.g., European Union Comm’n, Consultation Document: Review of
Directive 2002/87/EC on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit
Institutions, Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial
Conglomerate, 1, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-conglomerates/
docs/20091106_questionnaire_fcd_revier.pdf (“The Commission services would
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it is not the most effective way of legitimating the resulting
standards. So effective consultation of citizens may require
rethinking the drafting of consultation documents and avoiding
structured response forms. Again, the desirable changes
involve costs.

like to ask you to respond to the specific questions that were designed to
supplement the responses you may have given to the JCFC's consultation of
its draft Advice . . . In order for your contributions to be timely and properly
evaluated, when submitting your replies, please maintain the structure of the
questionnaire provided in this document.”).

